Judge Walther Disqualified the Key Witness at the Suppression Hearing
2010-02-06 15:47:23
By Donald Richter
Every time I think that I can’t be shocked any further by the high-handed disregard for justice displayed by Judge Barbara Walther, I find another example of her appalling behavior. During the last few days I have been studying the transcript of the Suppression Hearing held in May 2009, challenging the legality of the raid on the YFZ Ranch. The upcoming hearing in Judge Steven Conn’s court in Kingman, Arizona, as well as the anticipated review of Judge Walther’s decision when appeals are filed in Texas, makes the testimony and proceedings at this earlier hearing very relevant to current events.
In the Suppression Hearing considerable testimony was introduced to show that both Ranger Long and Sheriff Doran failed to apply even minimum standards of investigation to establish the veracity of the “Sarah” calls before Ranger Long sought a search warrant to enter the Ranch. Near the end of the hearing, defense attorneys had intended to solidify this position by using the expert testimony of Professor Gerald S. Reamey to address the question of “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal.”[1] Such testimony was the last thing desired either by Judge Walther or by Deputy Attorney General Eric Nichols.
It would be difficult to find a person in Texas better qualified to testify on this issue than Gerald Reamey, who has been intimately involved in the training of law-enforcement officers for almost thirty years. After graduating cum laude from Southern Methodist University in 1977, Mr. Reamey received basic peace officer certification from the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officers Standards and Education (T-CLEOSE) and worked for three years for the City of Irving, Texas, as legal advisor for the Police Department and simultaneously as adjunct professor at the University of Dallas Graduate School of Management until 1982, when he took his current position as Professor-of-Law at St. Mary’s University School of Law. He is the only living honorary life member of the Texas Police Association and is also a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Texas Association of Police Attorneys, having served as chair of the latter organization. He has been the director, co-director, and associate director of the Institute of World Legal Problems at the University of Insbrook, Austria. For almost twenty-six years, he has prepared for the Texas Police Journal a monthly police legal digest known as the blue pages, which is considered the Bible for peace officers regarding the current state of the law. He has also prepared the semi-annual peace officer’s guide to Texas law, published by the Texas Police Association, and has published numerous articles regarding police work in law-enforcement magazines. He is the author of Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Texas and the co-author of Texas Criminal Procedure, a casebook used in law schools throughout Texas.[2]Mr. Nichols attempted to disparage the Professor’s credentials by getting him to admit that he had not previously testified in a like hearing and expressing astonishment at his answer:
Q. Sir, have you ever testified in a court of law on a Franks hearing[3] as to the standard of police conduct, ever?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Never? Not once?
A. Not to my recollection.
Q. You have been a law professor since 1982, correct?
A. Not in a Franks hearing, no, sir.[4]
Judge Walther reacted to the proffered testimony of this well-qualified legal expert as a personal affront, as though he would be treading on her own sacred territory rather than giving information that would assist her in rendering her decision. This was apparent in several interchanges with defense attorney Gerald Goldstein:
The Court: Just so that I understand, your offer is for him to instruct the Court as to what the law is.
Mr. Goldstein: No.
The Court: Oh, good.[5]
Mr. Goldstein: It is not so much to tell the Court what the law is, but to tell the Court what is the standard of training and experience within the law enforcement community as to what is expected by those who train the law enforcement professionals, what is expected of them.[6]
The Court: Are you offering him to tell me what in his opinion the minimum standards for training for an officer on this particular topic, what those standards are? If you are offering him to tell me that the facts that he has listened to don’t measure up to the minimum training, that goes basically to what some of us used to call the ultimate issue and I don’t think you can offer anybody to tell the Court that.[7]
In his first objection to allowing Professor Reamey to testify, Mr. Nichols appealed to Judge Walther’s pride and also found fault with the fact that although the Professor had been involved for years in training officers he had not served as a patrol officer himself:
…and at this point in time we would object that this Court does not need a law professor to either instruct or educate the Court, however it is posed, on the law, and furthermore,…we would obviously object to any testimony that this witness would give with respect to police work on grounds that this witness has never actually served as a practicing police officer.[8]
Mr. Goldstein cited as a precedent a case where a court’s refusal to suppress was reversed on appeal because statements in an affidavit based on an anonymous informant had not been corroborated. Judge Walther questioned the relevance of this case because the caller in the YFZ case had given a name:
The Court: Now Davis was an affidavit based on an informant. You have not cited to the Court any case where the officer’s affidavit was based upon a victim or a reporting organization that has attached to its report a victim’s outcry statement, have your, sir?
Mr. Goldstein: I have not.
The Court: Do you know of any case in that nature?
Mr. Goldstein: No, but the cases that I have seen that dealt with victims normally deal with victims where there is some appreciable reason to give them credibility, like they come in and present themselves....I am just suggesting that nothing was done here and the idea that simply by giving a name you take yourself out of the anonymous informant I think is to give credibility to something that is meaningless.[9]
Immediately following this discussion, Judge Walther made her most outrageous argument when she implied that any consideration of whether or not law enforcement conducted a minimal investigation to corroborate the “Sarah” story was immaterial since the caller identified herself by name. Such an interpretation could explain Judge Walther’s later ruling, in which she ignored the other evidence introduced at the Suppression Hearing to show the inadequacy of the investigation by law enforcement. She cited as her authority Belton v. State (900 Southwest 2nd, 886, Court of Appeals, El Paso, 1995), a case in which one of the survivors of a homicide identified the murderer:
The Court: In that case the concern was an eye witness and a sworn affidavit that the police officer reviewed to make his affidavit to give to the Court. Seems kind of similar to what we have here, isn’t it?[10]
The Court: …but the important part of it is, to me it sets a different standard where the individual victim gives a name…It says to me that the need for an officer to do further investigation is not there, if there is a named person that is claiming to be the victim.[11]
Mr. Nichols supported the Judge in her analysis of this situation, but Mr. Goldstein distinguished between the Belton case and the YFZ case and discussed at some length how unreasonable it would be to think that police have no obligation to investigate the veracity of a phone call if the caller merely supplies a name. Were warrants to be issued on the basis of such a flimsy pretext, we would all be at the mercy of any prankster who made wild allegations of criminal activity.
Mr. Goldstein: [Responding to Judge Walther’s statement quoted above] That makes sense, except for one problem. Every case I have seen like this case talks about direct contact with the police and I would suggest the reason that is important is for the very reason that it happened in this case. Simply giving a name, particularly a fictitious name, adds nothing to anybody’s credibility, but when you present yourself and you are directly in contact with the police, you are subjecting yourself to very serious scrutiny. When you do that, you could—Then they could ask you questions. You subject yourself to scrutiny by police.
When you simply call a hot line and give a name, that adds nothing. Nobody is going to give you credit, nobody is going to loan you money, nobody is going to sell you any goods. Nobody is going to do anything if you just call up and…give a mane and there is no way to corroborate it, and we shouldn’t be invading hundreds of people’s homes based upon somebody just saying, “I’m so and so,” …where somebody just gives a name and that gives them credibility.[12]
In a final appeal to the Judge’s vanity, Mr. Nichols reminded her that she could refuse to allow a witness to testify from the mere fact that she didn’t feel the testimony would be helpful to her in reaching her decision:
Mr. Nichols: Your Honor, this witness has not been shown to…be qualified to give the testimony he is proffered to give….You…are the trier of fact. You have the unequivocal ultimate say on whether you believe this testimony would assist you in that endeavor…[13]
This was a very convenient way to avoid having embarrassing testimony in the court record when the judge already knew the decision she intended to render.
When Mr. Goldstein proffered the witness, Judge Walther ruled, “For the reasons proffered, the Court will not allow him to testify.”[14]
Although the Texas courts will not be bound by Judge Conn’s decision in Arizona, it is refreshing to know that this case is about to be considered in an impartial court where all of the evidence will be evaluated and the judge does not have a vested interest in justifying his own prior conduct.
[1] State of Texas vs. Frederick Merril Jessop, “Motion to Suppress Hearing,” Schleicher County, Texas, 51st Judicial Court, Vol. 11, 16 May 2009, 64.
[2] Ibid., 56-59.
[3] Lawyers.com. “a hearing to determine whether statements made by police officers in an affidavit that was used to obtain a search warrant by which evidence incriminating the defendant was found are false and constitute perjury or reckless disregard for the truth.”
[4] “Motion to Suppress Hearing,” 97.
[5] Ibid.,” 64-65.
[6] Ibid., 87.
[7] Ibid., 88.
[8] Ibid., 63.
[9] Ibid., 70-71.
[10] Ibid., 71.
[11] Ibid., 77.
[12] Ibid., 77-78.
[13] Ibid., 95.
[14] Ibid., 97.
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